Statute not unconstitutionally vague for failure to define "kickbacks." People v. Bynum (1990) 145 Ill.Dec. 468.

In People v. Abrams, 21 Ill.App.3d 734, 316 N.E.2d 5 (1st Dist., 1974), court held that the use of the disjunctive in a complaint charging the failure to register for a State Firearm Owner's identification card rendered the complaint void because it lacked the necessary certainty to charge an offense. In People v. Davis 177 Ill.2d 495 (1997) the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the sentence for a FOID card violation by a felon was unconstitutionally disproportionate.

In People v. Ruberg (3rd Dist., 1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 671, the Court held that a mental state is not a required element of the offense of unlawful entry into a motor vehicle. Also see: In Re JR (4th Dist., 1980), 82 Ill. App. 3rd 714.

Constitutionality of Statute upheld. People v. Gentry (1989) 139 Ill.Dec. 883; People v. Ward (1990) 141 Ill.Dec. 162; People v. Jones (1990) 148 Ill.Dec. 431; People v. Fudge (1990) 153 Ill.Dec. 577; People v. Steffens (1991) 153 Ill.Dec. 135 and People v. Nicholson (1991) 160 Ill.Dec. 742.

In People v. Delay (4th Dist. 1979), 70 Ill. App. 3rd 712, the Court held that the offense of using a false name on a vehicle registration or title application is an absolute liability offense. Also, see People v. Sudzus, (1st Dist., 1984), 121 Ill. App. 3rd 387. However, in People v. Yarbrough (Ill. 1989), 132 Ill. Dec. 422, the Court held the People must prove intent to defraud in all "fraud" causes.

In People v. Turner (1976) 64 Ill. 2d 183, the Court held that the only elements necessary to prove this offense are the act of driving a motor vehicle on the highway of the State and the fact of revocation. (Also see People v. Johnson (4th Dist., 1988) 170 Ill. App. 3rd 828.)

Constitutionality of penalty provision of this offense is upheld. People v. Meyer (1990) 144 Ill. Dec. 201.

People v. Harmison, 91 Ill. Dec. 162, 108 Ill. Id 19.7, (1985) conspirators, is a guilty of this offense, need not have entered into this conspiracy at the same time or have taken part in all its actions. People v. Foster, 99 Ill. 2d 48, 457 N.E. 2d 405 (1983) actual agreement between two persons is needed for conviction under this Section.

People v. Hill, 53 Ill. App. 3d 280, 368 N.E. 2d 714 (1st Dist., 1977), an attempt to commit an offense is established only where the actor's intent is to commit a specific offense.

In People v. Viser, 62 Ill. 2d 568, 343 N.E. 2d 903 (1975), the Illinois Supreme Court held that aggravated battery could be the underlying forcible felony in a felony murder charge where the aggravated battery is alleged to have been committed against the person who eventually dies. In People v. Oaks 169 Ill.2d 409 (1996) the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the use of disjunctive phrases in charging murder was not unconstitutionally duplicitous.

Constitutionality of Statute upheld. People v. Ford (1991) 163 Ill. Dec. 766 and People v. Shoultz 289 Ill.App.3d (4th Dist., 1997)

People v. Burks (1989), 137 Ill. Dec. 129. The People are not prohibited from initially charging defendant with second-degree murder.

People v. Potter, 5 Ill. 2d 365, 125 N.E.2d 510 (1955) - Evidence of speed alone is not sufficient to sustain conviction for reckless homicide. People v. Eveland, 81 Ill. App. 3d 97, 400 N.E.2d 1078 (4th Dist. 1980) - In order for an event to constitute reckless homicide with an automobile, reckless act must consist of method or manner in which automobile is being operated. People v. Smith, 99 Ill.2d 467, 459 N.E.2d 1357 (1984) - Recklessness must be alleged in the body of a reckless homicide information. People v. Beard (1989) 138 Ill. Dec. 615. Allegation of Intoxication without allegation of reckless conduct renders indictment defective. People v. DeBord, 344 Ill.App.3d 321, 800 N.E.2d 809, 279 Ill.Dec. 521 (2nd Dist., 2003). The failure to allege and prove that the victim was a family member or household membe results in the vacation of a Class 2 felony conviction. People v. Henry, 343 Ill.App.3d 133, 796 N.E.2d 718, 277 Ill.Dec. 632 (2nd Dist., 2003). This offense withstands a constitutional attack.

People v. Stiles, 46 Ill.App.3d 359, 360 N.E.2d 1217 (3rd Dist., 1977) - Mere silence is insufficient to constitute concealment of homicidal death; People v. Mahon, 77 Ill.App.3d 413, 395 N.E.2d 950 (1979) - Crime of concealment of a homicide is comprised of elements of knowledge that homicidal death has occurred and some affirmative act of concealment by the defendant.

People v. Mulcahey, 50 Ill. App. 3d 421, 365 N.E. 2d 1013 (4th Dist., 1977) - Asportation is not an element of 10-1(a)(1).

In People v. Satterthwaite, 72 Ill. App. 3d 483, 391 N.E.2d 162 (4th Dist. 1979) held movement or attempted movement was not an element of unlawful restraint; People v. Wisslead, 108 Ill.2d 389, 484 N.E.2nd 1081 (1985) held that an information which used the language of this statute was sufficient.

People v. Kavinsky (1981), 53 Ill. Dec. 705; People must allege defendant held victim hostage with intent to influence conduct of third party.

Constitutionality of this Subsection is upheld. People v. Rogers (1990) 139 Ill. Dec. 714 and People v. Williams (1990) 141 Ill. Dec. 444.

Unlawful Visitation Interference Offense withstands constitutional attack. People v. Warren 177 Ill.2d 348 (1996).

Defendant's act of masturbation did not constitute violation of provision prohibiting "sexual conduct." People v. Harris (1990) 150 Ill.Dec. 747.

People v. Anderson, 97 Ill. Dec. 747, 143 Ill. App. 3rd 567, (1986): This offense does not apply to a "patron" who solicits a prostitute. (Also, see People v. Holloway, 97 Ill. Dec. 607, 143 Ill. App. 3rd 735, (1986))

Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, (1977), held not to be unconstitutionally vague and overboard; People v. Glass, 41 Ill.App.3d 43, (1st Dist., 1976), held the disjunctive use of state of mind was not fatally defective. People v. Capital News, Inc. (1990) 148 Ill.Dec. 1, held that indictment charging "sale or delivery" of obscene materials was void for duplicity.

Constitutionality of this offense was upheld. People v. Ewen 1990, 141 Ill.Dec. 433 and People v. Lowe (1990) 148 Ill.Dec. 136.

People v. Hale, 77 Ill. 2nd 114, 395 N.E. 2nd 929 (1979) held that actual physical harm need not be alleged and proved where the victim is in one of the specially protected classes of persons. Constitutionality of offense upheld. People v. Lowe (1990) 148 Ill.Dec. 136 and People v. Buie (1991) 160 Ill.Dec. 616.

People v. White, (1993), 181 Ill. Dec. 746, defendant's knowledge of the age of the victim is not an element of this offense.

People v. Hicks, 100 Ill. 2d 366, 462 N.E. 2d 473, (1984) - Boiling water is a caustic substance within the meaning of this statute.

This subsection withstands a constitutional attack. People v. Milash, 329 Ill.App.3d 153, 769 N.E.2d 131, 263 Ill.Dec. 929 (2nd Dist., 2002). Use of disjunctive phrases is not unconstitutionally duplicitous. People v. Oaks 169 Ill.2d 409 (1996).

People v. Gross, 52 Ill.App.3d 765, 367 N.E.2d 1028 (4th Dist. 1977), held that a finding that the defendant had acted knowingly and recklessly was not legally inconsistent; People v. Swanson, 84 Ill.App.3d 245, 405 N.E.2d 483 (2nd Dist. 1980), spanking of a child by boyfriend of mother was sufficient to support conviction of reckless conduct.

People v. Intercoastal Realty, Inc., (1986) 103 Ill. Dec. 767, 148 Ill. App. 3rd, 964. This offense is not unconstitutionally vague, though it failed to list specific types of housing deterioration it was designed to prevent.

People v. Proctor, 85 Ill.App.3d 190, 406 N.E.2d 570 (3rd Dist. 1980), intent to harm another is not an element of intimidation.

U.S. ex rel. Holder v. Circuit Court of 17th Judicial Circuit, (1985) 624 S. Supp. 68: This subsection was unconstitutionally overbroad.

People v. Hubble, 81 Ill.App.3d 560, 401 N.E.2d 1282 (2nd Dist. 1980). It is the exercise of an improper influence which is the gravamen of the offense of intimidation and it is immaterial whether facts threatened to be disclosed are true or not.

Hate Crime Offense withstands constitutional attack. In re Vladimir P. 283 Ill.App.3d 1068 (1st Dist., 1996) and People v. Nitz 285 Ill.App.3d 364 (2nd Dist., 1996)

Stalking Offense withstands constitutional attack. People v. Zamudio 228 Ill.Dec. 382 (1st Dist., 1997) and People v. Cortez 286 Ill.App.3d 478 (1996).

People v. Pettus, 84 Ill.App.3d 390, 405 N.E.2d 489 (4th Dist., 1980) - Information charging defendant with home invasion, which failed to include allegation that defendant entered home "without authority", was fatally defective.

People v. Haywood, (1987), 515 N.E. 2d 45, 118 Ill. 2d 263, Court held sex offenses statute to be constitutional.

Constitutionality of this offense is upheld. People v. Mitchell (1990) 146 Ill.Dec. 596.

Constitutionality of this offense is upheld. People v. Richardson, (1975) 60 Ill.2d 189. People v. Gervasi, 89 Ill.2d 522, 434 N.E.2d 1112, (1982) Removal of speaking element of mouthpiece of telephone extension makes telephone an eavesdropping device. Unaltered extension telephone is not an eavesdropping device. People v. Gray (1991), 154 Ill.Dec. 219.

People v. Graves, 207 Ill.2d 478, 800 N.E.2d 790, 279 Ill.Dec. 502 (Ill., 2003) The penalty for unauthorized theft withstands a constitutional challenge. People v. Collins, 48 Ill.App.3d 643, 362 N.E.2d 1118 (3rd Dist., 1977), held that words "obtain and "exert" control are interchangeable given their plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Alexander, 93 Ill.2d 73, 442 N.E.2d 887 (1982): The precise date of the theft is not an element of the offense of theft.

People v. Wurster, 83 Ill.App.3d 399, 403 N.E.2d 1306 (3rd Dist. 1980) - Term "deception" within meaning of statute prescribing theft by deception is defined as knowingly to create or confirm impression which is false and which offender does not believe to be true.

People v. Mendoza, 62 Ill.App.3d 774, 379 N.E. 2d 380, 19 Ill. Dec. 716 (4th Dist. 1978), full retail value means the same as "fair cash market value"; People v. Willard, 92 Ill.App.3d 74, 414 N.E.2d 504 (2nd Dist. 1980), reference to "full retail price" directed at removal of merchandise from the store without paying the fixed price and the State need not establish the actual price of the merchandise to prove a violation of the statute. People v. McNeal (1983) 120 Ill.App.3rd 625,458 N.E.2d 630: Retail theft statute is constitutional.

People v. Ogunsola (1981), 87 Ill. 2nd 216, Intent to defraud is an essential element of the offense of deceptive practices. People v. Beam, 55 Ill.App.3d 943, 370 N.E.2d 857 (5th Dist., 1977), there is no need to allege in a single charge all acts occurring within a 90-day period but the prosecutor should do so whenever practicable.

People v. Muzzarelli, 331 Ill.App.3d 118, 770 N.E.2d 1232, 264 Ill.Dec. 536 (3rd Dist., 2002) The defendant's indictment was sufficient to support his Forgery conviction. People v. Henderson, 71 Ill.2d 53, 373 N.E.2d 1338 (1978), it is immaterial to the crime of forgery whether anyone is in fact defrauded. People v. Reynolds, 85 Ill.App.3d 549, 407 N.E.2d 64 (5th Dist. 1980), instrument which is subject to charge must show on its face an apparent capacity to defraud or the indictment must include a statement of extra facts establishing such capacity. People v. Connell, 91 Ill.App.3d 326, 414 N.E.2d 796 (5th Dist. 1980), definition of makes in the context of the forgery statute includes "endorses". People v. Eston, 49 Ill.App.3d 747, 364 N.E.2d 609 (4th Dist., 1977), intent to defraud may be presumed from the delivery of a forged instrument. People v. Hockaday, 93 Ill.2d 279, 443 N.E.2d 566 (1982), information which used the language of this Subsection was sufficient.

People v. Arnold, 48 Ill.App.3d 250, 362 N.E.2d 461 (3rd Dist. 1977), an essential element of robbery is the use of force or the threat of the imminent use of force. People v. Avant, 178 Ill.App. 3rd 139, 532 N.E. 2d 1141 (4th Dist., 1989), A mental state is not an essential element of robbery. Click here for discussion.

People v. Myatt, 66 Ill.App.3d 642, 384 N.E.2d 85, the use of a dangerous weapon can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. People v. Talley, (4th Dist. 1988) 177 Ill.App.3rd 170, 531 N.E.2d 1139, A mental state is not an essential element of armed robbery. Click here for discussion.

Aggravated Robbery Offense withstands constitutional attack. People v. Brackett 288 Ill.App.3d 12 (2nd Dist., 1996)

People v. Walker, 61 Ill.App.3d 891, 378 N.E.2d 607 (2nd Dist., 1978), a burglary indictment was defective where two separate entries were made and the indictment did not specify which entry was made the basis of the burglary count. People v. Rothermel, 88 Ill.2d 541, 431 N.E.2d 378 (1982), ownership is not an element of the offense of Burglary. People v. Steppan, 195 Ill.2d 310, 473 N.E.2d 1300 (1985), Burglary statute is constitu-tional. Defendant cannot be convicted of burglary by unlawfully remaining, where evidence showed that defendant unlawfully entered building. People v. Boone (1991) 160 Ill.Dec. 463.

People v. Blakeney, 59 Ill.App.3d 119, 375 N.E.2d 1309 (1st Dist., 1978). Possession of burglary tools is not a lesser included offense with respect to attempted burglary.

People v. Bales 108 Ill.2d 182, 483 N.E.2d 517 (1985), Residential Burglary Statute is constitutional. People v. Sexton, (1983) 118 Ill.App.3d 998, 455 N.E.2d 884, Residential Burglary applies to building intended to be used as a residence regardless of whether it was actually being used as a residence at the time of the burglary.

Constitutionality of this offense is upheld. People v. Thomas (1990) 148 Ill.Dec. 751 and People v. Williams (1992) 170 Ill.Dec.78. In People v. Parsons 284 Ill.App.3d 1049 (1st Dist., 1006) an indictment which alleged that defendant committed aggravated arson by knowingly damaging property on a specific date and at a specific address when he knew or reasonably should have known that people were present therein was sufficient.

People v. Duda, 84 Ill.2d 406, 419 N.E.2d 909 (No. 53403, March Term, 1981), Mere refusal to depart does not itself suffice to demonstrate interference with another person's lawful use or enjoyment of the land.

People v. Witzkowski, 53 Ill.2d 216, 290 N.E.2d 236 (1972) appeal dismissed; 93 S.Ct. 2162, 411 U.S. 961, 36 L.Ed.2d 682, this statute is held constitutional.

People v. Donnenfeld, 62 Ill.App.2d 991, 379 N.E.2d 710 (1st Dist., 1978), The State was not required to prove that the tear gas projector contained a noxious substance as charged in the complaint.

In People v. Zazzetti, 6 Ill.App.3d 858 286 N.E.2d 745 (1st Dist., 1972), the court held accessibility of the weapon is not an element of this offense; In People v. Abrams, 21 Ill.App.3d 734, 316 N.E.2d 5 (1st Dist., 1974), upheld the complaint in which the statutory language had been used; In People v. Edwards, 63 Ill.2d 134, 345 N.E.2d 496 (1976), the State must allege and prove a prior conviction to establish the commission of felonious unlawful use of a weapon.

Constitutionality of offense is upheld. People v. Dean (1990), 152 Ill. Dec. 653.

For sufficiency of charge see: People v. Baez, 20 Ill.App.3d 896, 314 N.E.2d 258 (1st Dist. 1974)

People v. Grant (1981) 101 Ill. App. 3d 43, 427 N.E.2d 810, Indictments charging mob action was defective in that they failed to incorporate mental state requirement. In People v. Nash 173 Ill.2d 423 (1996), the failure to allege sufficient facts resulted in a void complaint.

In People v. Raby, 40 Ill.2d 392, 240 N.E.2d 595 (1968) Supreme Court held that Section 26-1(a) was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. In People v. Luttrell, (4th Dist., 1985) 134 Ill. App. 3d 328 charging disorderly conduct which stated base language of this statute was insufficient. In People v. Foxall 283 Ill.App.3d 724 (3rd Dist., 1996) a Disorderly Conduct information based upon filing a false report was legally insufficient for failing to set forth the alleged false report.

People v. Caffrey, (1983) 97 Ill.2d 526, 455 N.E.2d 60: Syndicated Gambling Statute is constitutional.

People v. Holdman, 73 Ill.2d 213, 383 N.E.2d 155 (1978), held a warrantless arrest is an "authorized act" if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has committed an offense. People v. Jones, 67 Ill.App.3rd 477, 384 N.E.2d 523 (3rd Dist., 1978), resisting an officer is a specific intent crime requiring proof that the defendant acted knowingly. People v. Stoudt (1990) 144 Ill.Dec. 466, Offense of resisting a peace officer requires act of physical resistance on part of defendant.

People v. Lyda, 27 Ill.App.3d 906, 327 N.E.2d 494 (2nd dist., 1975) held the "physical evidence" destroyed, concealed or altered should be described with specificity in the complaint.

Concealing a Fugitive Offense withstands constitutional attack. People v. Miller 171 Ill.2d 330 (1996)

People v. Lewis, 25 Ill.Dec. 436, 386 N.E.2d 910 (1979), held this statute to be constitutional.

In People v. Aud, 52 Ill.2d 368, 288 N.E.2d 453 (1972), Court held that perjury indictment must set forth alleged false statement, either verbatim or in substance. People v. Beacham, 50 Ill.App.3d 695, 365 N.E.2d 737 (1st Dist., 1977), to support a perjury conviction, a false statement must be proven material to the matter at hand.

In People v. Yarbrough (5th Dist., 1987) 162 Ill. App. 3rd 748, the court ruled that an indictment couched in general language of this statute was, by itself, insufficient.

People v. Markovich, (1990) 142 Ill.Dec. 491, held statute constitutional. People v. Ratliff, 65 Ill.2d 314, 357 N.E.2d 1172 (1976), held "willfulness is an essential element of the crime of violation of a bail bond".

People v. Branstetter, 103 Ill.App.3rd 259, 430 N.E.2d 731 (1982) Illinois Bribery Statute is constitutional.

People v. Deal, 25 Ill.Dec.564, 387 N.E.2d 21 (3rd Dist. 1979), held failure to allege that the act was done while in the defen-dant's official capacity is fatal to an indictment on a charge of Official Misconduct. People v. Bassett (5th Dist.,1988), 169 Ill. App. 3rd 232, held that indictment charging misconduct must allege statute, rule, regulation, or tenet defendant violated. Official Misconduct Statute does not particularize this offense and thus the language of this statute, without more, cannot support a valid indictment. People v. Davis 281 Ill.App.3d 984 (1st Dist. 1996)

People v. Davis, 199 Ill.2d 130, 766 N.E.2d 641, 262 Ill.Dec. 721 (Ill., 2002) The possession of a BB gun could not be used to support an armed violence conviction. People v. Christy (1990) 151 Ill.Dec. 315, Constitutionality of sentencing scheme is upheld. People v. Biesiada (1990) 146 Ill.Dec. 557, Sentence for Armed Violence is unconstitutionally disproportionate to that of Aggravated Kidnapping based on same elements. Constitutionality of statute upheld. People v. Espinoza, 184 Ill.2d 252, 702 N.E. 2d 1275, 234 Ill. Dec. 372 (1998) and People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 705 N.E. 2d 91, 235 Ill. Dec. 478 (1998). People v. Howard, Ill.App.3rd, 397 N.E.2d 877, (4th Dist., 1979), category of weapon is an essential element of the offense.

In Interest of Nitz, 54 Ill. App. 3d 851, 368 N.E. 2d 1111 (3rd Dist., 1977), there is no fixed standard for a determination of neglect of a minor, and each case must be judged on its particular facts.

Constitutionality of sentencing provision upheld. People v. Rauh (1990) 143 Ill. Dec. 884.

People v. Tarlton, 91 Ill. 2nd 1, 434 NE 2d 1110 (1982): Fraudulent use of credit card where nothing of value is actually obtained is a Class A misdemeanor regardless of the value of the goods sought to be obtained.

In People v. Mayberry & Hurley, 63 Ill.2d 1, 345 N.E.2d 97 (1976), Court held that classification scheme of Cannabis Control Act and Controlled Substance Act are not unconstitutional merely because they are based on the gross weight of substance containing cannabis or controlled substance.

People v. Binkley, 25 Ill.App.3d 27, 322 N.E.2d 514 (5th Dist., 1975), upheld the sufficiency of an indictment couched in substantially identical wording as the above complaint.

In People v. Chambers, 66 Ill. 2d 36, 360 N.E.2d 55 (1976), the Court held the Illinois Curfew Law to be constitutional.

People v. Clutts, 43 Ill.App.3d 366, 356 N.E.2d 1367 (5th Dist., 1976), failure to specify gram amount fatal to an indictment on this charge. People v. Mayberry, 63 Ill.2d 1, Statute found to be constitutional.

Constitutionality of this offense is upheld. People v. Grochocki, 343 Ill.App.3d 664, 796 N.E.2d 153, 277 Ill.Dec. 538 (3rd Dist., 2003); People v. marsh, 329 Ill.App.3d 639, 768 N.E.2d 108, 263 Ill.Dec. 348 (1st Dist., 2002); People v. Fuller, 324 Ill.App.3d 728, 756 N.E.2d 255, 258 Ill.Dec. 273 (1st Dist., 2001); People v. Adams (1991) 163 Ill.Dec. 483.